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I.

O
W
I

INTRODUCTION

uter space is becoming increasingly militarized.1 And, as a result of this
increased militarization, the concept of warfare waged from, to, and through
outer space is naturally finding greater expression in both military doctrine2

1. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE, AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, 2016 DEFENCE WHITE
PAPER ¶ 2.55 (2016), http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/Docs/2016-Defence-Whi
te-Paper.pdf (“Limiting the militarization of space will also require the international community to work together to establish and manage a rules based system – a prospect that
does not seem likely in the immediate future.”).
The militarization of space includes the continued deployment of military or dual use
satellites that assist military forces in the terrestrial environment. For example, the Space
Security Index (SSI) notes that as of 2016 the United States has 150 dedicated military satellites, in addition to 31 GPS satellites, Russia has 54 dedicated military space satellites in addition to 27 GLONASS satellites, and China has 58 dedicated military satellites. SPACE SECURITY INDEX 2017 (Jessica West ed. 2017) 93–94. The United States, China, and Russia
also have developed ground-based anti-satellite (ASAT) missile capability. These States are
also developing space-based kinetic kill vehicles, radio frequency weapons, space “mines,”
microsatellites capable of rendezvous and proximity operations, and “dazzling” lasers that
can be used to degrade satellite functionality. Id. at 114–16, 118–19. See also Harsh Vasani,
How China Is Weaponizing Outer Space, THE DIPLOMAT (Jan. 19, 2017), https://thediplomat.
com/2017/01/how-china-is-weaponizing-outer-space/ (noting that China continues to
develop its co-orbital ASAT capability); Harry Pettit, Russia Has Developed Powerful LASERS to Shoot Down Enemy Satellites as Experts Warn a Space War Could Break out ‘Within
Years’, DAILY MAIL, Feb. 28, 2018, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-5444
255/Russia-develops-powerful-lasers-shoot-enemy-satellites.html (noting that Russian
forces are developing space-based lasers that can target satellites); Gareth Corfield, America’s Mystery X-37B Space Drone Lands after Two Years in Orbit, THE REGISTER (May 8, 2017),
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/05/08/x37_space_drone_lands_2_years/ (noting
that the United States is developing a space drone “designed to operate at altitudes of between 110 and 150 miles above the Earth’s surface”).
The increasing militarization and weaponization of outer space also has been the subject of considerable academic commentary. See, e.g., Emily Taft, Outer Space: The Final Frontier
or the Final Battlefield, 15 DUKE LAW AND TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 362 (2017), Linda Johanna
Friman, War and Peace in Outer Space: A Review of the Legality of the Weaponization of Outer Space
in the Light of the Prohibition on Non-Peaceful Purposes, 16 FINNISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 285 (2005); Michael C. Mineiro, The United States and the Legality of Outer Space
Weaponization: A Proposal for Greater Transparency and a Dispute Resolution Mechanism, 33 ANNALS
OF AIR AND SPACE LAW 441 (2008).
2. See, e.g., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-14: Space Operations
(2013), http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_14.pdf; Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, UK Ministry of Defense, Joint Doctrine Publica76
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and military legal manuals.3 In fact, despite international efforts to stem such
militarization,4 outer space is now seen by some as a viable theater of future
warfare, no different from its land, sea, or air counterparts.5
Given this emerging thinking regarding space warfare, it is critical to identify the way international humanitarian law (IHL) would apply to armed conflict in outer space. The concept of armed conflict in outer space contemplates both the use of force in outer space itself and the use of space assets to
achieve military effect in the air, land, and sea environments. The 1991 Gulf
War, for example, has been touted as the first space war, not because it was
fought in space, but because coalition forces relied so heavily on space-based
assets.6 Accordingly, targeting satellites and other space-based assets in space
(from the terrestrial environment or from space itself) becomes the focus of
specific attention. This topic raises broad questions of how IHL would regulate activity in the unique physical environment of outer space.7 While such
questions are undoubtedly important from a purely IHL perspective, they
cannot be answered without addressing the more fundamental issue of how
IHL interacts with the international legal regime that already applies to outer
space. This regime is principally comprised of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty
(OST) and four other key treaties. Together, these treaties provide the foundational framework for peacetime activity in outer space: the outer space legal
regime. The interaction between the two regimes has the capacity to modify
tion 0-30: UK Air and Space Doctrine (2d ed. 2013), www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/223495/jdp_0_30_uk_air_and _space_doctrine.pdf.
3. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF
WAR MANUAL ch. XIV, at 917–45 (rev. ed. Dec. 2016), https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD%20Law%20of%20War%20Manual%20-%20June%2020
15%20Updated%20Dec%202016.pdf?ver=2016-12-13-172036-190 [hereinafter LAW OF
WAR MANUAL].
4. See generally Paul Meyer, Dark Forces Awaken: The Prospects for Cooperative Space Security,
23 THE NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 495 (2017).
5. See, e.g., Marcia S. Smith, Top Air Force Officials: Space Now is a Warfighting Domain,
SPACEPOLICYONLINE.COM (May 17, 2017), https://spacepolicyonline.com/news/top-airforce-officials-space-now-is-a-warfighting-domain/ (“In their joint written testimony, the
Air Force officials said: ‘Clearly, freedom to operate in space is not guaranteed. In fact, space
is now a warfighting domain, similar to the more familiar air, land, and maritime domains
our men and women are fighting in today.’”).
6. See generally Larry Greenemeier, GPS and the World’s First “Space War”, SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN, Feb. 8, 2016, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/gps-and-the-worlds-first-space-war/.
7. See generally Dale Stephens & Cassandra Steer, Conflicts in Space: International Humanitarian Law and Its Application to Space Warfare, 40 ANNALS OF AIR AND SPACE LAW 71 (2015).
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the way IHL rules apply, even selectively excluding some rules altogether.
Conversely, the application of IHL may displace accepted understandings of
space law. Despite the potential for unanticipated outcomes arising from a
collision of these regimes, there has been little analysis of the implications of
their interaction.
Accordingly, this article will examine applicable legal theory with reference to the interaction of the law of outer space and IHL in the context of
armed conflict occurring from, to, or through outer space. It will canvass
questions of interpretive vertical hierarchy and horizontal priority and examine the International Law Commission’s (ILC) recent work on the effects of
armed conflict on treaties, as well as the separate ILC review of the impact of
subsequent State practice on treaty interpretation.
This examination will lead to the conclusion that while the outer space
legal regime does continue to apply in a time of armed conflict and does directly apply to regulate specific conduct occurring during armed conflict; it
nonetheless is subject to general legal rules that prioritize the right of selfdefense, as well as IHL. The article concludes that the mechanical application
of prevailing treaty interpretive maxims does not easily settle issues of potential legal conflict between the outer space legal regime and IHL. As such, different interpretive approaches need to be developed on a case-by-case basis
to ensure effective harmonization. In circumstances where harmonization is
not possible, a stark policy choice will be required to select which regime will
apply and in what manner.
II.

THE OUTER SPACE LEGAL REGIME

The outer space legal regime comprises five main treaties, headed by the
OST,8 which is the most comprehensive treaty and closest to representing a
quasi-constitution for space. The four further treaties deal with issues of the
rescue and return of astronauts,9 liability,10 registration,11 and activities on the
8. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
9. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched in
Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119.
10. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar.
29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187.
11. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975,
28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15.
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moon.12 The treaties range in date from 1967 to 1979, though each treaty has
a sequentially lower number of States parties.13 This decrease led after 1979
to an increased reliance upon “soft law” instruments to guide the legal framework applicable to space activities.14 Such a change of approach could reflect
a growing realization by States of the military utility of outer space, as well
as the increased access, lower costs, and capacity for civil, commercial, and
military space activity.
The preamble to the OST provides that the exploration and use of outer
space shall be undertaken for “peaceful purposes.”15 This emphasis on
peaceful purposes is repeated in Article IV, which provides that “[t]he Moon
and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty
exclusively for peaceful purposes.”16 Notably the term “peaceful” is not defined in the Treaty. In addition to the references to peaceful purposes, Article
I provides that “exploration and use” of outer space “shall be the province
of all mankind.”17 Article II further provides that there shall be no national
appropriation of space or any celestial body by claim of sovereignty18 and
Article V provides that astronauts are “envoys of mankind.”19 Article IX requires a State party to “undertake appropriate international consultations before proceeding with any such activity,” when it has reason to believe that
carrying out this activity in outer space “would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of other States parties.”20
12. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3.
13. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty has 105 States parties, the 1968 Rescue Convention
has 95, the 1972 Liability Convention has 94, the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space has 63, and the 1979 Moon Convention has 17. See Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Status of International Agreements Relating to
Activities in Outer Space as at [sic] 1 January 2017, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2017/CRP.7,
at 12 (Mar. 23, 2017), http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/spacelaw/treatystatus/
AC105_C2_2017_CRP07E.pdf.
14. See, e.g., Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for
International Direct Television Broadcasting, G.A. Res. 37/92 (Dec. 10, 1982); Principles
Related to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Space, G.A. Res. 41/65 (Dec. 3, 1986); Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, G.A. Res. 47/68 (Dec.
14, 1992).
15. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8, preamble.
16. Id. art. IV.
17. Id. art. I.
18. Id. art. II.
19. Id. art. V.
20. Id. art. IX.
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Given the themes and legal obligations imposed by the OST, it may seem
that the conduct of any military activity in outer space is prima facie inconsistent with the outer space legal regime, ostensibly because such activity by
itself may be characterized as non-“peaceful.” However, Article IV undermines such a conclusion. Indeed, the Article provides only one specific prohibition on military activity: “States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to
place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any
other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial
bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.”21
Plainly, this Article anticipates military activity though proscribes only specific aspects of that activity. Moreover, Article III demands, “States parties
shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including
the Moon and other celestial bodies in accordance with international law,
including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining
international peace and security and promoting international cooperation
and understanding.”22 The combination of Articles III and IV seem to contemplate that military activity conducted in a manner consistent with the
U.N. Charter is permitted, though subject to the specific prohibitions on the
placement in orbit of weapons of mass destruction and the establishment of
military bases, installations, and fortifications on the moon and other celestial bodies. Despite this conclusion, the specific interplay between the remaining provisions of the OST and military activities, including the conduct
of hostilities in outer space, is subject to a high level of theoretical and practical conjecture.
III. APPLICATION OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY AND THE IMPACT OF
ARMED CONFLICT
The OST was developed against a background of evident optimism regarding humanity’s ventures into outer space. Drafted at a time when there were
principally only two space powers, namely the USSR and the United States,
the treaty seemed to anticipate something of a sui generis application of legal
normativity to this new operating environment. While there were consistent
overtures to “peaceful” use and concepts of “envoys of mankind” and
“province of mankind” in its provisions, the OST failed to provide any level
of specificity or even define such concepts. Despite these invocations, it was
21. Id. art. IV.
22. Id. art. III.
80

International Legal Implications of Military Space Operations

Vol. 94

equally evident that preceding (and postdating) the conclusion of the OST,
both the USSR and the United States engaged in military activities in space,
with the deployment of military surveillance satellites and the conduct of
military testing. Indeed, because of this State practice, it came to be understood that “peaceful” meant “non-aggressive,”23 which was consistent with
the U.N. Charter as required by Article III of the OST. This interpretation
permitted the conduct of peacetime military activities that did not offend
understandings of the operative provisions of the OST, despite the normative tension such an accommodation generated. Therefore, military use of
space was permitted, or at least tolerated, as consistent with the prevailing
regime of peaceful, cooperative activity in outer space.
However, beyond this peacetime application of the OST, a deeper and
more resonate question is how the OST would continue to apply in a time
of armed conflict. The ILC, in its authoritative report on the issue of the
impact of armed conflict on the continued application of treaties,24 concluded that traditional rules relating to treaty interpretation as contained
within the 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT)25 applied
to determine whether a treaty was susceptible to termination, withdrawal or
suspension in the event of armed conflict. To this end, in a time of either
international or non-international armed conflict,26 reference first needed to
23. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 3, § 14.10.4, at 943–45; see also Fabio Tronchetti,
The Applicability of Rules of International Humanitarian Law to Military Conflicts in Outer Space: Legal
Certainty or Time for a Change?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 55TH (2012) COLLOQUIUM ON THE
LAW OF OUTER SPACE 357, 362 (2012)
States have shown growing acceptance of these military uses of outer space which are generally referred to as “passive”, in the sense that space assets are utilized as tools to support
military operations on the ground and not as means to carry out acts of aggression in the
space environment against other space objects.

24. Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties, with Commentaries, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/66/10, at 175–211
(2011) (noting that the Draft Articles and Commentaries were also published in volume 2
of the 2011 Yearbook of the International Law Commission) [hereinafter ILC Armed Conflict Report].
25. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
26. ILC Armed Conflict Report, supra note 24, art. 2(b) (“‘[A]rmed conflict’” means a
situation in which there is resort to armed force between States or protracted resort to armed
force between governmental authorities and organized armed groups.”). Article 2(b) “reflects the definition employed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the Tadic decision” in defining a non-international armed conflict. Id. art. 2(b), cmt.
(4). The language “resort to armed force between States” defines an international armed
conflict as set forth in Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. See, e.g., Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed
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be made to the relevant treaty itself to ascertain whether provision had been
made for its continued application in armed conflict.27 In the absence of such
a reference, there was still a presumption that the treaty would continue to
apply unless there was a reason for non-application. Some types of treaties
create a stronger presumption that they would survive transition to a time of
armed conflict.28 These were treaties with certain subject matter at their core,
namely those that dealt with IHL; land and maritime boundaries; treaties of
friendship, commerce and navigation in relation to private rights; human
rights; environmental protection; watercourses and aquifers; international
settlement of disputes; and diplomatic and consular relations.29
With respect to the OST, it is evident that it does not include any specific
provision relating to its application in a time of armed conflict. This contrasts
with treaties such as the 1954 Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in a Time of Armed Conflict, which has provisions relating to
peacetime, wartime, and post-war application.30 Perhaps more relevantly,
treaties like the OST, such as the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention,31 which
establishes legal boundaries in the maritime environment, do continue to apply in a time of armed conflict, although they are subject to the rules of IHL
as they apply in that physical and legal environment.32
As to the other provisions of the OST, it remains unclear as to how they
would apply in a time of armed conflict. Significantly, the ILC fully acknowledged in its report that a
State exercising its inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations is entitled to suspend

Forces in the Field art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; see also COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION I FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE
WOUNDED AND SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 32–33 (Jean Pictet ed., 1952).
27. ILC Armed Conflict Report, supra note 24, art. 4, cmts. (1)–(3).
28. Id. art 7.
29. Id., annex; see also id., annex cmts. (1)–(77).
30. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict
arts. 3, 7, 18, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240.
31. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397.
32. See, e.g., SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED
CONFLICTS AT SEA pt. II (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995); U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS
& U.S. COAST GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS ch. 7(2007).
82

International Legal Implications of Military Space Operations

Vol. 94

in whole or in part the operation of a treaty to which it is a Party insofar as
that operation is incompatible with the exercise of that right.33

Accordingly, those provisions of the OST that interfere with rights of selfdefense as reflected in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter would be inapplicable
to the extent of the inconsistency. Despite this rather large exception, it is
unlikely that specific prohibitions relating to weapons and military activities,
such as those contained in Article IV, would be suspended because of an
application of Article 51.34 Such a reading is consistent with any number of
weapons treaties that operate in a time of armed conflict relating, inter alia,
to chemical and biological weapons.35
Importantly, the ILC in its draft articles also concluded that in a time of
armed conflict, the lex specialis that applies is IHL, to the detriment of other
inconsistent regimes.36 While the utility of the mechanism of lex specialis is
increasingly questionable as an effective ordering principle under international law, such a conclusion does envisage a level of methodological priority
for IHL vis-à-vis the space law regime. If one accepts the findings of the
ILC, it would seem certain that in a time of armed conflict, the OST would
continue to apply. However, its application would be tempered by the nature
of the armed conflict and resulting normative reconciliation with IHL and
other applicable legal regimes. While sovereignty claims to space and celestial
bodies would remain prohibited, and the OST would continue to bar the
placement in orbit of weapons of mass destruction, other provisions would
be subject to an interpretive process of harmonization. Hence, in certain
cases, OST provisions would be accorded priority, whereas in others, IHL
provisions would govern conduct in space, even those that were contrary to
33. ILC Armed Conflict Report, supra note 24, art. 14.
34. U.N. Charter, art. 51.
35. See, e.g., Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction art. 1(b), Jan. 13, 1993, 1974
U.N.T.S. 45 (“Each State Party . . . undertakes never under any circumstances . . . to use
chemical weapons”); Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction art.
1, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop,
produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: (1) Microbial or other biological agents,
or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have
no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in
armed conflict.

36. ILC Armed Conflict Report, supra note 24, art. 2, cmt. (4).
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the OST. Determining the manner of this reconciliation would remain a matter of interpretation.
IV.

INTERPRETATION OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY IN A TIME OF
ARMED CONFLICT

It is a feature of contemporary international law that multiple legal regimes
can apply to a single legal question. Further, given the diffused nature of
international legal practice, there is a real potential of conflicting legal norms
arising from these regimes. The imprecise relationships between legal forms,
between law and policy, and the disquiet expressed regarding the realization
of particularized interpretive tropes illustrate the disaggregated nature of international legal practice. Indeed, the reach for a unifying metanarrative that
reconciles these disparate features within the international legal enterprise
remains elusive. The 2006 ILC study on the fragmentation of international
law makes clear that the international legal structure comprises numerous
“rule-complexes”37 that come with their own “ethos.”38 The ethos of one
specialized law is not necessarily identical to that of a neighboring specialization and the two may not be easily reconciled. Examples include international environmental law and international trade law, coastal State and flag
State jurisdiction over vessels, domestic criminal law and international human rights, and of course, outer space law and IHL. The difficulty in reconciling specialized rules is a product not only of their nature and subject matters, but also of legal cultures, needs for specialization, and activities of particular legal caucuses that promote the objectives and goals of these separate
areas of law. Accepting this, the practice of international law, particularly in
the context of armed conflict in outer space, is one that is undertaken within
a highly pluralist field of interpretation. This is a field where the realization
of a unified and coherent structure proves largely illusory.
In the context of the OST, it is highly relevant to examine how particular
provisions have been applied in practice to determine their reach in a time
of armed conflict. To this end, subsequent State practice provides an accepted and effective mechanism to understand the meaning accorded to provisions of the OST, which can then be compared with potentially contrary
37. Rep. of the Study Group of the Int’l Law Comm’n, (Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi), Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion
of International Law, ¶¶ 8, 10, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) [hereinafter ILC
Fragmentation Report].
38. Id. ¶ 15.
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IHL obligations. If provisions of the OST have seldom been relied upon in
practice, or have been given a narrow meaning in peacetime, it would provide a relevant reference point for undertaking the exercise of reconciliation
with IHL in a time of armed conflict.
State practice comprises a major component of determining the existence of customary international law. Aside from this well-known use, subsequent State practice is also recognized in the VCLT as a means of interpreting treaty provisions. Article 31(1) states, “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”39
Importantly, Article 31(3)(b) provides, “There shall be taken into account,
together with the context: Any subsequent practice in the application of the
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.”40
Indeed, so significant is the role of subsequent practice that the ILC is
currently engaged in a multiyear study of its importance to treaty interpretation.41 In the reports produced to date, the ILC has concluded that subsequent practice is an “authentic” means of interpretation.42 Subsequent practice has been broadly identified as including legislative action, administrative
practice, and official acts, as well as action, reaction, acquiescence, and relevant silence by other States to those acts.43
The ILC has identified that several criteria need to be present for subsequent practice to be an authentic means of interpretation. Hence, States must
be parties to the treaty and the actions taken must be “relational” to the
treaty.44 In this context, “practice may include official statements concerning
the treaty’s meaning, protests against non-performance, or tacit consent to
statements or acts by other parties.”45 Conduct by itself can qualify as relevant “State practice,” provided it can be established that States are manifest-

39. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 25, art. 31(3).
40. Id.
41. See Georg Nolte (Special Rapporteur), First Report on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to Treaty Interpretation, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/660 (Mar. 19, 2013).
42. Id. ¶ 8.
43. Id. ¶¶ 110–11, 134.
44. Id. ¶ 76.
45. Id. ¶ 110.
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ing a position in relation to the interpretation of the relevant treaty in question.46 In this regard, it is important to recall that silence can also be relevant
practice and, provided it is identifiable, it need not be formally designated.47
The issue relating to the role of silence and acquiescence is particularly
relevant in the contemporary period. It has been noted that States have become generally reticent to make public statements concerning legal rights
and obligations.48 This appears to be particularly acute in IHL and national
security contexts.49 At the same time, it has been observed that the academic
commentary has quickly filled this void, generating trajectories of meaning
and interpretation that provide creative, but not always accurate representations of international law,50 let alone a State’s assumed position. Accordingly,
while necessarily a delicate process of analysis, the absence of complaint or
reaction by a State party in the context of another State’s conduct, especially
in circumstances where the former’s apparent rights or entitlements have
been infringed, has meaning under Article 31(3) of the VCLT. States are the
still the subjects and not the objects of international law and despite the profusion of academic commentary as to what the law is—or more typically
what the law should be—it is still States that occupy the exclusive role as the
creators of international law.
Given this background regarding the manner in which subsequent State
practice can inform treaty meaning, it is useful to examine how provisions
of the OST have been applied by States. Significantly, the requirements of
establishing a relational context are easily met in the case of space and the
OST. The OST remains the primary governing treaty dealing with space conduct; hence, State activities within space are necessarily undertaken in direct
connection with this specific regime. Thus, identifying State practice is relatively straightforward and allows for greater confidence in assessing how
terms of the OST would apply in a time of armed conflict.
Article IX is one provision that deserves particular attention. As previously noted, the Article requires, inter alia, when a State party engages in an
activity that “would cause potentially harmful interference with activities of
46. Georg Nolte (Special Rapporteur), Second Report on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to the Interpretation of Treaties, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/671 (Mar. 26,
2014).
47. Id. ¶ 59.
48. Michael N. Schmitt & Sean Watts, The Decline of International Humanitarian Law
Opinio Juris and the Law of Cyber Warfare, 50 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 189,
191 (2015).
49. See id. at 195–209.
50. Id. at 192.
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other State Parties . . . it shall undertake appropriate international consultations before proceeding with any such activity.”51 This requirement is capable of being carried out in a time of armed conflict, and may obligate the
belligerents to warn civilians and neutral States of attacks or other “potentially harmful interference” with their activities or assets.
Such an obligation is not entirely unknown under IHL, which mandates
that warnings be given in certain circumstances preceding attack;52 however,
Article IX purports to go further and raises the specter of a broader range
of military activities that may be encompassed within its provisions. Much
turns on what conduct would constitute “potentially harmful interference”
and the nature and content of the consultations required. Hence, does Article IX set a high or low threshold, one where potential damage or other
interference is probable as opposed to merely possible?
Recourse to State practice reveals that Article IX has rarely been invoked.53 In the fifty years since the OST came into force, there have been
only two instances where Article IX has been the subject of international
engagement. One occasion arose after China undertook a kinetic anti-satellite strike on its own FY-1C weather satellite in 2007 that caused considerable
orbital debris.54 In that instance, several countries, including the United
Kingdom, United States, Canada, India, South Korea, Australia, and Japan,
asserted that Article IX obligations were activated and that consultation was
obliged prior to the strike, although China failed to take such action.55 The
second occasion occurred in 2008 and revolved around a U.S. declaration
that its obligations under Article IX were not activated prior to targeting its
own USA-193 satellite that had fallen into low orbit and represented a threat
51. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8, art. IX.
52. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 57(2)(c), June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (noting that “effective advance warnings shall be given of attacks which
may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit”).
53. Sarah M. Mountin, The Legality and Implications of Intentional Interference with Commercial
Communication Satellite Signals, 90 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 101, 150 (2014).
54. Michael C. Mineiro, FY-1C and USA-193 ASAT Intercepts: An Assessment of Legal
Obligations under Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, 34 JOURNAL OF SPACE LAW 321, 336
(2008).
55. There is an argument that Cold War practice, in which the USSR and the United
States did not consult prior to ASAT tests, represents relevant State practice indicating that
there is not an obligation to consult under Article IX prior to conducting such tests. However, the effects of the tests were limited and does not support a conclusion that State practice has established that there is no obligation to consult for kinetic ASAT tests or experiments in outer space. See id. at 345–47.
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to the terrestrial environment.56 The attack resulted in the destruction of the
satellite; with the low atmosphere causing the resulting debris largely to burn
up in de-orbit.57 Academic analysis of Article IX puts focus on the State’s
knowledge that the consequences of a planned action would represent an
interference with peaceful uses of outer space.58 Clearly, creating a large
physical debris field that threatens existing orbits and the general space activity of other States satisfies this criterion.59 The two actions were therefore
qualitatively different: the obligation was activated in the case of the Chinese
attack, but not in the case of the U.S. attack.60 These two instances represent
the only time in fifty years where international attention has focused on Article IX. Such paucity of State practice would seem to establish that a very
high threshold of “potential harmful interference” is required. In turn, this
threshold would inform the interpretation of this Article in a time of armed
conflict.61
In relation to the conduct of armed conflict in outer space, there is (fortunately) no State practice in the public domain to draw upon to inform
meaning of other OST provisions. Despite this, positions adopted by nations
in their military law manuals regarding the conduct of hostilities in outer
space may represent sufficient State practice for the purposes of Article 31(3)
of the VCLT. Hence, the updated U.S. Department of Defense Law of War
Manual is instructive in its dealing with IHL and outer space.62
In section 14.10.3, the Law of War Manual reaffirms the prevailing understanding that Article IV of the OST only prohibits the placement of weapons
of mass destruction in full orbit, not the placement of other space-based
weapons systems. In fact, it expressly cites anti-satellite laser weapons and
other conventional weapons, which would include suborbital defensive
weapons such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, as not
being subject to the prohibition contained in Article IV. Notwithstanding
these statements, the Law of War Manual does recognize the prohibition of
atomic testing in the space environment as a requirement deriving from the
Limited Test Ban Treaty.63
56. Id. at 332.
57. Id. at 348–52.
58. Id. at 337–38.
59. Id. at 354.
60. Id. at 352.
61. Id. at 334.
62. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 3, ch. XIV, at 917–45.
63. Id. § 14.10.3, at 942–43.
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The Law of War Manual also provides deeper clarity that the term “peaceful purposes,” as contained within the OST, is to be equated with the term
“non-aggressive . . . consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and
other international law.”64 Such a statement is significant given the initial
views held by some States65 and academics66 that all military activity was prohibited in outer space. Over time, State practice, including that of the USSR,
which had initially held contrary views, coalesced into an understanding that
“peaceful” did not prohibit all military activity. The statement in the Law of
War Manual provides a clear confirmation of the U.S. view—a view shared
by others67—that “peaceful” does not mean non-military. Moreover, the Law
of War Manual further states “this interpretation of ‘peaceful purposes’ is like
the interpretation given to the reservation of the high seas for ‘peaceful purposes’ in the LOS [Law of the Sea] Convention.”68 The ILC acknowledged
that the use of analogy between one treaty and another, where terms are
similarly expressed, is an acceptable instance of State practice.69 It is notable
however that the statement in the manual is also accompanied by the words
“non-aggressive and beneficial,”70 suggesting that not only are actions not to
violate concepts of aggression under the jus ad bellum, but that there is a further element of restraint implicit in the words “and beneficial.” The extent
of this further restraint remains unarticulated in the manual. Certainly, the
idea of sovereign claims to space are excluded under Article II of the OST,
and perhaps this form of wording serves to merely reinforce that provision
in the case of actions that constitute “aggression” in the space context.
Moreover, the Law of War Manual fully acknowledges the application of
Article IV of the OST and the prohibition of the establishment of permanent
64. Id. § 14.10.4, at 943–45.
65. Emilion Jaksetic, The Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Soviet Views, 28 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 483, 493 (1979).
66. See, e.g., Manfred Lachs, The International Law of Outer Space, 113 RECUEIL DES COURS
1, 90–91 (1964); BIN CHENG, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 520–22 (1997).
67. The United States, China, and Russia are developing military capability in space and
there has been an absence of protest by these States, or any other State with respect to these
activities. See supra note 1. See also Tronchetti, supra note 23, at 362
The ‘non-aggression’ approach argues that, as long as military activities in space are carried
out in accordance with Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, they are consistent with international
law. . . . This approach, promoted by the United States, has progressively gained support
and finds evidence in State practice.

68. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 3, § 14.10.4, at 943–45.
69. First Report on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to Treaty Interpretation, supra note 41, ¶ 101.
70. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 3, § 14.10.4 n.164, at 943.
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military bases on the Moon. But while the Law of War Manual makes clear
statements regarding the OST and the way military activities will be conducted in accordance with many of its terms, it also expresses uncertainty as
to other terms and their application to such activities. Hence, the manual
expresses a level of disquiet over the way Article III may “import” general
international law, given the terrestrial context in which such law was developed.71 At the same time, it expresses no reservation regarding the general
application of IHL to outer space in a time of actual armed conflict,72 even
though the context in which some of the law applicable to armed conflict
presupposes a land, sea, or maritime environment.
The Law of War Manual provides a level of clear expression from a major
spacefaring country as to the way provisions of the OST will be interpreted
and applied in the conduct of military activities. It asserts that the placement
of weapons of mass destruction in full orbit and the establishment of military
bases on the moon and other celestial bodies are prohibited in accordance
with the OST. To this extent, the United States plainly anticipates the prima
facie continued operation of at least part of the OST during an armed conflict,
though it also acknowledges the application of IHL. It reaffirms that the law
of aggression will apply to space military activities in a time of armed conflict
(or otherwise) and it reserves the right of the United States to deploy weapons that are not weapons of mass destruction into full orbit.
Finally, the Law of War Manual manifests State practice for the purposes
of Article 31(3) of the VCLT, as does the apparent acquiescence and silence
that comes from other States as to these pronouncements. Despite the enunciation of clear principles and interpretations of the OST, as contained within
the manual, there is still a high level of ambiguity regarding the way the OST
and IHL interact. It declares that IHL will apply, but does not examine the
manner of intersection between this body of law and the OST. Accordingly,
the resolution of normative tension between the two regimes then falls to
the general principles of international law.
V.

VERTICAL HIERARCHY AND HORIZONTAL PRIORITY

In reconciling the intersection between the OST and IHL, the concepts of
jus cogens (vertical hierarchy) and lex specialis (horizontal priority) provide possible mechanisms for resolving potential conflict.
71. Id. § 14.10.2.2, at 941–42.
72. Id.
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Jus cogens find expression in Article 53 of the VCLT.73 It establishes a
hierarchy of peremptory norms that have priority over other more general
norms of international law. Prohibitions such as unlawful use of force, slavery, or the performance of an act criminal under international law (such as
torture and war crimes) are usually cited as having such status,74 but it is
difficult to identify other topics that come within the concept. To the extent
that peremptory norms are contained in either the OST or IHL regarding
armed conflict in space, such norms would take precedence in resolving legal
conflicts. At face value, there are elements in both regimes that would apply,
but such application hardly resolves the preexisting normative tension because they do not act in any kind of opposition. Thus, the concept of nonaggression as interpreted under the OST (through the peaceful activity provisions) does override provisions in IHL, but given that IHL’s focus is on
jus in bello not jus ad bellum, there is no need for reconciliation of the two
regimes. The other two jus cogens prohibitions contained in IHL—torture and
war crimes—find no expression in the OST. Hence, while applying the jus
cogens concept would seem to resolve any apparent conflict, it is unnecessary
to do so because there is no direct or implied conflict between IHL and the
OST in this context.
Unlike vertical hierarchy mechanisms, the lex specialis maxim does offer
greater potential to resolve normative conflict. This maxim provides that the
“specific shall prevail over the general.”75 It enables a faithful application of
the lawmaker’s intention to govern specific circumstances where provision
has been made for such regulation vis-à-vis more general legal requirements.
Despite finding no expression in the VCLT, the lex specialis maxim has
been cited in several International Court of Justice cases to resolve apparent
conflict.76 It has also been highlighted by the ILC as a useful mechanism for
reconciling disparate areas of international law.77 As an interpretive mechanism, it seems to offer a solution to the reconciliation of apparent conflict
between legal regimes, as is the case with the outer space regime and IHL.
73. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 25, art. 53.
74. Reports of the International Law Commission on the Second Part of Its Seventeenth Session and
on its Eighteenth Session, [1966] 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 169, 248,
U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.l.
75. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW (6th ed. 2008) 124 (noting that
“[t]here is . . . a principle to the effect that a special rule prevails over a general rule”).
76. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶ 25 (July 8).
77. Anja Lindroos, Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal System: The Doctrine of
Lex Specialis, 74 NORDIC JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 27, 35 (2005).
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Despite this apparent superficial attraction and the ease with which it may
be applied, this interpretive maxim to resolve normative conflict between
the regimes is unlikely to produce the outcomes sought.
In her analysis of lex specialis, Lindroos correctly makes the point that the
maxim’s utility is best realized when applied to treaties that are from the same
field or subfield.78 In that situation, there exists a contextual relationship between instruments where priorities may be measured through the word
choice, emphasis, or even silence that is evident from the terms of the treaties. Intention can be more reliably discerned given the shared focus.
Such a contextual relationship does not exist, however, where treaties
come from different fields, as is the case of the OST and those treaties comprising the core of IHL. Indeed, there are views that both actually represent
the lex specialis.79 Such views are hard to reconcile and raise numerous further
questions. For example, how do the respective ratios of obligation in each
regime get measured in such circumstances? The answer lies not in any mathematical assessment of the specificities resident in the provisions themselves,
but rather in a broader value judgment that one regime is to be preferred
over the other.80 This in turn relies on political—or at least policy—choices,
as to which regime or provision will have application. Thus, this decision is
less about resolving contextual choice in a logically precise manner than of
selecting which policy preferences and political values will prevail.81
The application of the lex specialis maxim to resolve potential conflict between regimes in the context of IHL in outer space carries with it enormous
significance, a significance this interpretive tool cannot possibly be expected
to fulfill. Numerous examples of its inadequacy can be imagined. Take for
instance, the question of the very existence of an armed conflict. Traditional
determinations of when an armed conflict begins turn on whether there has
been a resort to armed force between two States.82 There exist separate rules
within the regime of State responsibility that help determine who the “State”
is for such purposes. Long-established rules of general international law have
78. Id. at 41.
79. For the view that space law is the lex specialis, see Frans von der Dunk, International
Space Law, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW 29 (Frans G. von der Dunk & Fabio Tronchetti
eds., 2015). For the view that IHL is the lex specialis, see ILC Armed Conflict Report, supra
note 24, art. 2, cmt. (4).
80. Lindroos, supra note 77, at 42.
81. Id.
82. Prosecutor v. Tadic; Case No. IT-94-1-AR-72, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Oct.
2, 1995), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm.
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a broad understanding of attribution, which hold that a finding of attribution
is still within the reasonable limits of what a State actually authorizes or at
least in those instances where a State has effective control over a non-State
group.83 In the OST, Article VI creates a broad ambit of State responsibility,
including responsibility for actions of non–State actors who undertake space
activities within a State.84 Under Article VI, such activities are deemed “national activities” that the State must ensure are “carried out in conformity”
with the OST and under its “authorization and continuing supervision.”85
On one reading of this provision, any space activity occurring within the
territory of a State by non-State actors, irrespective of the actual control exercised by the State over the entity concerned, will trigger State responsibility.
If such activity involves manipulation of space systems or hacking of other
States’ satellites rising to a use of force, there is the real prospect of the host
State being unwillingly (and unwittingly) drawn into an international armed
conflict under existing definitions of IHL. Such an outcome would be consistent with one reading of the OST provision, though one that defies all
general international law on the issue of attribution. According lex specialis
status to the OST in such an instance defies not only legal and practical logic,
but also undermines its very purpose and object, which is directed towards
advancing the peaceful use of outer space.
Another example of an unanticipated result of according the outer space
legal regime lex specialis status is the question of the status of military astronauts in a time of armed conflict. Under the Rescue and Return Convention,
astronauts that unwittingly land in the territory of a State are required to be
“promptly” returned to the launching State,86 which is normally their State
83. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 105–15 (June 27).
84. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8, art. VI.
85. Id. In full, article VI states:
States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in
outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for assuring that
national activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present
Treaty. The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the Moon and
other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.

86. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched in
Outer Space supra note 9, art. 4
If, owing to accident, distress, emergency or unintended landing, the personnel of a spacecraft land in territory under the jurisdiction of a Contracting Party or have been found on
the high seas or in any other place not under the jurisdiction of any State, they shall be safely
and promptly returned to representatives of the launching authority.
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of nationality. In circumstances where a military astronaut engaged in armed
conflict lands in belligerent territory, this would prima facie require the return
of that astronaut to their launching State. Such return would be contrary to
the rights and obligations contained in the Third Geneva Convention,87
which enables the belligerent to retain the astronaut as a prisoner of war and
the obligations of a neutral State to intern members of a belligerent’s armed
forces downed in their territory for the duration of the conflict. Arguing that
the outer space legal regime is the lex specialis or even that this provision has
that status runs counter to core principles that underpin IHL.
Examples also run the other way. If the IHL regime, in toto, was determined to be the lex specialis, then establishing military bases on the moon
would be permissible. Such a development is plainly inconsistent with Article
IV of the OST, which prohibits the establishment of “military bases, installations and fortifications” on celestial bodies.88 It would also throw open the
issue of sovereign appropriation of celestial bodies, or perhaps even space
itself, which forms the basis for the assertion of many belligerent rights. Such
an outcome is completely at odds with the governing regime established for
the regulation of human activities in space.
VI.

RECONCILIATION OF REGIMES

Despite the superficial attraction of the interpretive rules like lex specialis, it is
evident that they cannot effectively reconcile the IHL and outer space regimes. This is a product of the limitation of the interpretive tools when there
are two parallel regimes that apply in very different ways to govern space
activity in a time of armed conflict. While invocation of the lex specialis maxim
would give the appearance of an objective standard of ordering, it would
ultimately be a subjective value judgment as to which regime or which provision is the more specific one. Such judgments are liable to result in inconsistent and unanticipated outcomes.
Given the decentralized nature of international law, diverging institutional commitments, and goals and objectives that accompany different “rule

87. Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
88. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8, art. IV. (“The moon and other celestial bodies
shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons
and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden.”).
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complexes,”89 the idea of a meta-rule that impartially settles such conflict in
a definitive manner is illusory. Despite such a conclusion, the international
legal system must retain its coherency, even in the face of contradictory visions generated by different regimes.
At present, there exists no meta-rule that would permit a confident approach to reconciling the different regimes. Interpretive techniques contained in the VCLT have their place, along with the lex specialis maxim, but
all such techniques should be guided by a sense of mutual reinforcement
between regimes. Where there is unavoidable conflict of opposing norms,
then a self-aware recourse to publicly stated values will need to underpin
interpretive choice. Such moments will expose a clash of ethos and professional commitment, but it need not be an exercise of relativism. There are
theories of interpretation that respected scholars such as Ronald Dworkin
have advanced that are designed to balance competing equities. These approaches may offer some solution to the interpretive questions discussed
above.
Dworkin’s concept of “law as integrity” is directed towards an interpretive technique that relies upon reason and a sense of moral judgment.90 According to Dworkin, law in its very essence is an interpretive enterprise.
Meaning is obtained not only from a textual analysis of words, but also
through identification of a set of coherent social and political principles that
underpin the relevant words that comprise the law.91 This approach requires
a considerable effort by the interpreter to develop the historical and political
reference point from which to determine the applicable legal coherence.92
The methodology is an ongoing process of “fit” and “justification” to make
the law cohere to political and historical facts and past practices by attributing a point, purpose, or value to those practices.93 Such an approach seems
to offer both the necessary flexibility and coherency that resolving the two
disparate regimes of space law and IHL require.
In applying Dworkin’s approach, it is necessary to locate unifying themes
between the two regimes and to place them in their historical or social context. The outer space legal regime promotes the peaceful exploration of
space with a view to benefiting all humanity. Humanitarianism is also present
in the utilitarian calculation that underpins IHL’s balancing of the equal and
89. ILC Fragmentation Report, supra note 37, ¶¶ 8, 11.
90. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 254–58 (1986).
91. Id. at 255.
92. Id. at 227–28.
93. Id. at 254–63.
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opposing elements of military necessity and humanity. To this extent, where
interpretations of the two regimes can accommodate a greater outcome of
human well-being or better protection, then such a solution should be preferred.94 I have argued elsewhere that this seemed to be at the core of the
International Court of Justice’s assessment of the interplay of IHL and international human rights law in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion,95 an
assessment that gave “weighted significance” to humanitarian outcomes in
any review of military action.96 Such reasoning has also found expression in
subsequent cases dealing with IHL in the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia where relative values placed on humanitarianism under IHL calculations were enhanced—or at least harmonized.97 Accordingly,
provisions of the OST that promote humanitarianism should be interpreted
in a manner to influence the humanitarian features of IHL. In practice, this
means that where there are two possible interpretations open to the application of IHL in a space context, the one prioritizing humanitarian outcomes
should be preferred. To this end, the OST may also act as a catalyst for locating special protections for classes of person or property when otherwise
under the purview of IHL. The idea of military astronauts engaged in purely
scientific exploration, removed from any belligerent activity, is a case that
comes to mind.98
VII.

THE ROLE OF MANUALS

Anticipating legal ambiguity and locating gaps in the law, and then grappling
with these issues in peacetime, ensures that the law has relevant and meaningful effect in a time of armed conflict. This has led to efforts over the last
twenty years of groups of international legal experts to prepare international
law operational manuals applicable in a time of armed conflict in areas of law
that are uncertain. In fact, it is not an overstatement to say that we currently

94. Lindroos, supra note 77, at 41 (providing an interpretive concept imported from
international human rights law).
95. Dale Stephens, Human Rights and Armed Conflict—The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons Case, 4 YALE HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT LAW JOURNAL 1 (2001).
96. Id. at 23.
97. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 424–25
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000).
98. Stephens & Steer, supra note 7, at 15–16.
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live in the age of the manual.99 The pace of technological development in
weapons of war, and the failure of States to keep up in the development of
the law regulating these new weapons, leaves room for significant gaps. The
last major revision of IHL in a general sense occurred in 1977 with the negotiation of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions.100 Since
that time, technologies and doctrine relating to cyber war, semi-autonomous
weapons systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, and space warfare all have advanced. States have claimed legal positions vis-à-vis these new technologies
and doctrines, such as those contained in the short “Air and Space Warfare”
chapter of the Law of War Manual,101 but such statements, while making
methodological choices in their preference for how various bodies of law
interact, do not outline with any great clarity the process of resolution.
To fill methodological and substantive gaps, professional communities
comprised of practitioners, military legal officers, government officials, and
academics (all often working in their private capacity) have taken the lead in
drafting international operational law manuals that seek to reflect the law in
these new or rapidly changing contexts. In doing so, they have continued the
practice of the past one hundred years in which manuals relating to the law
applicable in armed conflict were prepared by experts. These manuals restated the law, as then understood, in a coherent and concise manner for a
specific genre of warfare. Such manuals include the 1880 Oxford Manual102

99. See generally Dale Stephens, The Age of the Manual—The Impact of the Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare, 45 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 19
(2015).
100. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609.
101. See LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 3, at ch. XIV, at 917–45.
102. Institute of International Law, The Laws of War on Land, Sept. 9, 1880 (Oxford
Manual), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 29, 29–40 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri
Toman eds., 4th rev. ed. 2004).
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and the 1913 Oxford Manual of Naval Warfare, 103 both prepared by the Institute of International Law, and the 1923 Hague Draft Rules of Aerial Warfare
prepared by a Commission of Jurists.104
These older manuals have found their contemporary equivalents in the
form of the 1994 San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed
Conflicts at Sea,105 the International Committee of the Red Cross 2005 Customary International Humanitarian Law106 and 2009 Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law,107 the
2013 Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare,108 and
the 2017 Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations
prepared under the auspices of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence.109
These manuals articulate what is understood to be the prevailing lex lata.
However, their legal force is dependent entirely upon their persuasiveness.
Indeed, these manuals act by informing government decision makers of the
authors’ legal understanding of specific legal questions, thereby acting as a
catalyst to the development of the law based solely on government acceptance of their veracity. To date, while not without some academic criticism (usually made by those not involved in the drafting of the particular
manual) these manuals have received considerable recognition. They have

103. Institute of International Law, The Laws of Naval War Governing the Relations
Between Belligerents, Aug. 9, 1913 (Oxford Manual of Naval Warfare), reprinted in THE
LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 102, at 1123.
104. Commission of Jurists, Hague Rules Concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War and Air Warfare, Dec. 11, 1922 – Feb. 17, 1923, reprinted in THE LAWS
OF ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 102, at 315.
105. SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA, supra note 32.
106. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Jean-Marie Henckaerts &
Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005).
107. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON
THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2009).
108. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, MANUAL ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE (2009).
109. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2d. ed. 2017).
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found expression within national military legal manuals, as well as authoritative citation by international tribunals.110
To this end, a collaborative effort led by The University of Adelaide
(Australia), Exeter University (United Kingdom), the University of Nebraska
(United States), and The University of New South Wales (Australia) is developing The Woomera Manual on the International Law of Military Space Operations.111
The Woomera Manual project is directed towards reconciling legal regimes and
establishing a coherent narrative regarding the intersection of international
space law, the international law relating to the use of force, and international
humanitarian law. The manual will grapple with the collision of outer space
and IHL regimes as outlined in this article, and will forge outcomes to the
conundrums identified. As is the case with all previous manuals of this nature, The Woomera Manual project seeks to draft a manual that will be used as
a resource by military forces and governments in determining national positions concerning the legal interplay between regimes. It also seeks to create
a normative feedback loop, whereby the legal norms articulated are accepted
or rejected (which is equally useful), thus contributing to a better understanding of the legal rules within this field.

110. For example, the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts
at Sea has been cited in numerous international legal fora. See, e.g., Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Situation on Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia: Article 53(1) Report ¶¶ 31–32 (Nov. 6, 2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/otp-com-article_53(1)-report-06nov2014eng.pdf; Prosecutor v. Mrkšić et al.,
Case No IT-95-13/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 457 (International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2007); U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the International Fact-Finding
Mission to Investigate Violations of International Law, Including International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, Resulting from the Israeli Attacks on the Flotilla of Ships Carrying Humanitarian
Assistance, ¶ 50, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/21 (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/15session/A.HRC.15.21_en.pdf; 1 Jacob Turkel et al., The
Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 2010, at 33 (2011),
http://turkel-committee.gov.il/files/wordocs//8707200211english.pdf; Turkish National
Commission of Inquiry, Report on the Israeli Attack on the Humanitarian Aid Convoy to
Gaza on 31 May 2010, at 61 (2011), http://gazaflotilla.delegitimize.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/official-turkish-inquiry.pdf.
111. See UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE, THE WOOMERA MANUAL, https://law.adelaide.edu.au/military-law-ethics/woomera/.
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VIII.

CONCLUSION

The increasing militarization of space presents legal challenges relating to the
way existing legal paradigms might apply to regulate such activity, but more
fundamentally, as to how the existing outer space legal regime responds to
such developments. In the event of armed conflict occurring from, to, or
through space there is an inevitable convergence of applicable space and IHL
regimes that requires reconciliation.
Work undertaken by the ILC concerning the effects of armed conflict
on existing treaty regimes provides valuable insight into how treaty regimes
transition in a time of such conflict. In mapping the framework of such transition, the ILC identified priorities, not least of which was the centrality of
rights of national and collective self-defense vis-à-vis other treaty regimes.
The report also identified IHL as the lex specialis in such circumstances.
Navigating the intersection of the outer space legal regime and IHL is
fraught with uncertainty. Providing meaning to the inevitable ambiguity of
many provisions of the OST in such a context is greatly aided, however, by
subsequent State practice, which enables meaning to be accorded to its provisions. Such a process is envisioned by the VCLT to arrive at authentic
meaning. To this end, the multi-year ILC study on subsequent State practice
is useful in its conclusions. In the context of military activities, including
armed conflict in outer space, the U.S. Law of War Manual is a reliable source
of State practice for discerning the meaning, at least for that of one major
spacefaring nation. Further, the apparent tacit acceptance from other States
of this manual suggests a measure of State practice, thereby providing useful
illumination of the legal landscape vis-à-vis the two regimes.
While the two ILC studies provide a reliable level of confidence in establishing fundamental starting points, they nonetheless leave enormous
room for further interpretation. To this end, existing rules of international
legal interpretation may fill the void. Application of the jus cogens and lex specialis maxims would seem to offer a meaningful way forward, but in practice,
they offer little practical resolution. While reassuring in its clarity, the concept of lex specialis in particular, is a fraught one as a meta-rule for effective
ordering, at least in circumstances where there are two major regimes such
as those applicable to outer space and IHL.
What this indeterminacy leaves is a need for a provision-by-provision
analysis of each regime against an interpretive framework that seeks to optimize harmonization to the greatest extent possible. As this article has advanced, application of a Dworkin-like interpretive approach would offer
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both the coherency and flexibility necessary for the harmonization to be successful. Moreover, the concept of humanitarianism could provide a unifying
theme that would aid such resolution. Nonetheless, to the extent that norms
in both regimes remain irrevocably divergent, States will need to resolve
these differences through policy preference and political choice.
Recent efforts by scholars and government officials acting in their personal capacity to draft a manual that seeks to resolve such conundrums by
application of existing legal principles hopefully offers a means for effective
engagement by States to settle on the fused legal regime that would apply to
armed conflict in outer space. Such efforts must be successful. The international community placed enormous hope in the peaceful exploration and use
of space in the legal instruments initially drafted in the 1960s and the unifying
goal such activity would portend for humanity. In the current century, where
access to space has become more mainstream and where armed conflict is a
real possibility, it is imperative that future belligerents act within clear legal
boundaries of restraint if there is to be any hope of realizing the noble goals
of the 1960s.
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